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Abstract. This article is devoted to the study of which appears as the most famous
paradoxes of Quantum Theory (Schrödinger’s cat, EPR argument and Aspect’s ex-
periments, «delayed choice» experiments and retrocausality problems). Through
these experiments, physics raises so fundamental questions that it borders, at the
limit, with metaphysics. The present article supports the idea that the difficulties
encountered, so puzzling they are, manifest only a transitional state of the evolution
of physics, that can be expected to be outdated one day. In the meantime, caution
is necessary to avoid the excesses that could lead to metaphysical considerations a
little too premature.
Key words. Schrödinger’s cat, EPR argument, Delayed-choice experiments, retro-
causality, free-will theorem.
1 Introduction
Since 1905 and Max Planck’s introduction of a discrete approach to physical expe-
rience, in order to solve the contradiction between the Raleigh-Jeans law and the
law of Wien, and to find a unique explanation for electromagnetic radiation, Quan-
tum Mechanics has not stopped posing problems to physicists. The very notion of
irreducible quanta and the discontinuity of quantum phenomena remained rather
mysterious in the 1920s. As one knows, Bohr and Heisenberg have developped the
famous «Copenhagen interpretation» but the behavior of particles, reduced to ob-
servables and described by the infinite matrices of a Hilbert space, was still puzzling.
Indeed, with the passage to the wave formalism, Planck had put his finger in a gear :
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there was not only an irreducible difficulty with the duality wave-corpuscule - valid,
after the works of Louis de Broglie, for the matter as well as for the light -, but
physics, in general, was now going to encounter disturbing situations, very hard to
interpret. If the notion of wave - once Schrödinger had associated an equation -
had seemed to illuminate the situation for a moment, it had to be recognized that
this wave, except in the case of a single particle, was not a usual wave. In collision
experiments in particular, it was never diluted throughout the space. Moreover, for
a system of N particles, it propagated in a space of 3N dimensions. So Born went
to give a purely probabilistic interpretation of waves, forcing Quantum Mechanics
to give up a realistic description of particles, then bringing another mystery : the
«reduction of the wave packet» at the moment of measurement. It became obvious
that the wave function was therefore nothing conventional and even possessed para-
doxical properties: on the one hand, it did not have the meaning of a real physical
description, but on the other, it was not only a mathematical object, relative or
contextual, which would have described only the knowledge we have of reality. The
wave function (or its generalization, the state vector) was actually a subtle blend of
the two. It was going to result in many paradoxical situations which we examine
in the following, from the famous cat’s Schrödinger thought experiment to delayed
choice experiments, without forgetting, of course, the paradox EPR and its different
solutions.
2 Schrödinger’s cat and others
The first paradox raises the question of the limit between the quantum phenomena
and the classical (macroscopic) world of our daily experience. Everyone knows today
the story of the Schrödinger’s cat, which has elicited so much comment that it ended
up irritating the famous physicist Stephen Hawking. However, remember the essence
of the subject and its context.
As we know, the Schrödinger equation, governing the possible states of an elementary
particle, is that of a linear wave function. This implies that for two possible states
of the particle, the combination of the two states is also a possible state. On the
other hand, the observation of the phenomenon causes, as we say, the «collapse» of
the wave function, and therefore the reduction to a single state.
More precisely, it is the measure that disturbs the system - by what is called the
Compton effect (diffusion of an electron by an incident photon whose wavelength
increases) - and makes it bifurcate from a superimposed quantum state to a measured
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state. This state does not pre-exist the measure: it is the measure, apparently, that
makes it happen.
The notion of «superposition of states», when it applies to a particle or an atom, does
not raise a major problem in human mind. But, if one supposes a direct dependence
between the state of these quantum realities and that of a macroscopic system - which
suggests the linearity of the Schrödinger equation -, then it is another matter.
In 1935, in the context of Einstein’s investigation about physical reality, Schrödinger
- as Einstein himself praised it - was one of the few physicists to understand this
perfectly puzzling implication of Quantum Mechanics. His famous thought experi-
ment - known today as «Schrödinger’s cat» - was precisely intended to reveal the
problem raised and, as a result, to highlight the shortcomings of the Copenhagen
interpretation, especially with respect to the problem of measurement.
Schrödinger thus supposes a thought experiment in which a cat is enclosed in a box
with a device that kills the animal as soon as it detects the disintegration of an atom
of a radioactive substance. For example, a Geiger radioactivity detector, connected to
a switch, caused the fall of a hammer breaking a poison flask (Schrödinger proposed
hydrocyanic acid) which can be enclosed in liquid form in a pressurized flask and
vaporized, becoming a deadly gas once the bottle is broken.
Figure 1: Schrödinger’s cat Gedankenexperiment
If the probabilities indicate that a disintegration has a one in two chance of having
taken place after one minute, Quantum Mechanics indicates that, as long as the
observation is not made (or, more precisely, as long as there is no reduction of the
wave packet), the atom is simultaneously in two states: intact and disintegrated. But
the mechanism devised by Erwin Schrödinger links the state of the cat (dead or alive)
to the state of the radioactive particles, so that the cat would be simultaneously in
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two states (the dead state and the alive state), until that the opening of the box
(that is to say, the observation) triggers the choice between the two states. In the
meantime, it is impossible to tell if the cat is dead or not.
Obviously, we can challenge this presentation of things, the passage from quantum
formalism to natural language involving approximations.
Before the opening of the box, the cat is in a state which can be described, thanks
to the bra-ket Dirac notation, as a «ket-vector» |u〉 of the complex Hilbert space of
states E . As the kets form a vector-space, if λ1 and λ2 are some numbers representing
the probability amplitudes, and |u1〉 and |u2〉 are two kets of E , then :
|u〉 = λ1 · |u1〉+ λ2 · |u2〉.
In the case of the cat, as the probability to find him dead or alive is 1/2, so λ1 =
λ2 =
√
1/2 = 1/
√
2, and we may represent its state as :
|ucat〉 = 1√
2
.(|dead〉+ |alive〉).
So, to say that the cat is both dead and alive is a coarse simplification : the prob-
ability amplitudes could be complex numbers and the shift from linear addition to
linguistic conjunction is already an interpretation.
Moreover, we must recognize that this thought experiment, as it is described, is
totally unrealizable. First, the technical conditions to preserve the superimposed
state of the cat would be very difficult to realize. For the moment, they are, in fact,
quite unrealizable for more than a few molecules. Second, this thought experiment
appears unrealistic even in principle. Indeed, we can never directly demonstrate, or
measure, that the cat is both dead and alive, because the fact of knowing its state
would necessarily cause the collapse of the wave function.
However, we can not get rid of this paradox so easily, especially if, instead of ex-
perimenting with a real cat, we start by testing smaller objects. Moreover, it is not
entirely accurate that we can get no information about the cat and what’s going on
in the box without opening it. For example, a mouse could then pass through this
one and the probability of coming out could be measured. This weakened version of
the experiment was actually performed at the atomic scale (by sending a photon to a
superimposed atom in the excited and not excited state), and confirmed the predic-
tions of the theory. Various other tests are in progress, where the cat is replaced by a
beryllium ion trapped in a superimposed state, a superconducting quantum interfer-
ence device where electons flow both ways around the loop at once when they are in
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the «cat’s state», or again a piezoelectric «tuning fork» placed on a superposition of
vibrating and non vibrating states, including about 10 trillion atoms. An experiment
involving a flu virus has also been proposed and another involving a bacterium and
an electromechanical oscillator is suggested.
A variant of the Schrödinger cat’s experiment is that of Wigner’s friend. If the box is
replaced by a fully enclosed laboratory in which a man is locked up (this time a friend
to whom the physicist Wigner, who remains outside, asks to do a QuantumMechanics
experiment), we meet again some problem : should we think that it is by opening the
laboratory door, at the moment when Wigner himself becomes aware of the result of
the measurement, that the reduction of the wave packet will take place and that one
of the components of the state vector will be canceled? Should we not rather think
that this will take place as soon as the observer inside the laboratory becomes aware
of it? But if there are two distinct observations, we shall have now two different
state vectors – which is in contradiction with the assertions of Quantum Mechanics.
Should we think, as Wigner seems to believe ([Wig 95], that consciousness plays a
special irreducible role in Quantum Mechanics? But how to explain the difference
of appreciation of the two observers? Indeed, as long as Wigner did not open the
laboratory door, the whole laboratory is, for him, in a state superposition, whereas,
for his friend stayed inside and who has already taken knowledge of the result of
the experiment, the wave function has already collapsed. Should we think there is
a contradiction, or can we explain it, as Penrose claims ([Pen 16]), by saying that
the superposition of two conscious states is not paradoxical because, just as there is
no interaction between the multiple quantum states of a particle, the superimposed
consciousnesses here do not have to be conscious of each other?
All of this proves anyway that the interaction between quantum-level phenomena and
more complex entities, closer to our macroscopic experience - which is not a fruit of
our imagination - raises a lot of problems. So, the paradox remains, whatever one
thinks of it, and our starting question still remains too : do the quantum effects go
to infinity or, as it would be reasonable to think, stop at the end of a certain moment
or at a certain level? This is where the interpretations diverge.
In this context, if we do not content ourselves with the Copenhagen interpretation,
initiated by Bohr and Heisenberg, and for which Quantum Physics does not describe
an independent reality but the knowledge that we have of it, then different solutions
may be presented. Going from the most extravagant to the most plausible, there
would be:
1. The many worlds theory of Hugh Everett, which assumes that all complemen-
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tary quantum states – going to infinity – are actually realized, meaning that
the universe splits into multiple realities with every measurement.
2. The Wigner theory which assumes an influence of the consciousness of the
physicist (or the one who opens the box). It would be the realization of this
new state that would provoke, directly or indirectly, the collapse of the wave
function. Relational and transactional interpretations, or speculations about
the Zeno effect may be considered, in a certain way, as variants of Wigner’s
theory.
3. The theory of decoherence (defended by Murray Gell-Mann, Nobel Prize of
physics 1963), which states that the superposition can be maintained only in
the absence of interactions with the environment, which «trigger» the choice
between the two states (dead or alive). In such a theory, the break is caused
by physical interactions with the environment, so that the coherence is broken
all the more quickly that there are more interactions, and thus practically
instantaneously on the macroscopic scale where billions of billions of particles
are involved. In other words, the superposition state can only be maintained
for very small objects (a few particles).
4. Finally, theories seeking to modify QuantumMechanics, either by adding a vari-
able expressing initial conditions such as position (Bohm-de Broglie theory)(see
[Boh 51]), or by introducing additional hidden parameters in the quantum laws
(e.g. gravitation for Roger Penrose).
The many worlds theory seems to ignore Occam’s razor. Though not falsifiable,
and undeniably elegant (since it stays closer to the Schrödinger equation - which it
takes seriously - without introducing new artifacts), it is intellectually expensive and
probably closer to science fiction than to real science. Wigner’s hypothesis supposes
that a simple look can have material consequences : as it happens, consciousness
could kill, in the literal sense of the term. But what about animals? If we deny all
consciousness, or at least any form of consciousness comparable to that of human
beings, must we think that they themselves are capable of reducing the wave func-
tion? And otherwise, how are the currents flowing in the neurons of a human being
different from those that excite the neurons of non-conscious animals to produce the
collapse of the wave function? Wigner’s anthropological solution encounters, in fact,
numerous problems. Concerning, now, the theory of decoherence, one knows it is
verified only in a small number of cases and by means of simplifying assumptions.
Moreover, being essentially non-linear, it is difficult to deduce from the linear formal-
ism of Quantum Mechanics. Finally, the decoherence being only the preliminary step
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to the measurement, not the measurement itself, there is a risk of only repelling the
problem... to infinity. It seems, therefore, that there is room for further investigation
: this is what Schrödinger’s thought experiment has made it possible to highlight.
And this is what physicists do everyday now, which however, as we shall see, surprise
them in surprises, and put them in front of an extremely puzzling quantum reality.
Let us introduce now some other paradoxes.
3 Delayed choice experiments
3.1 Double-split experiment
As we know since Thomas Young (1801), light can display characteristics of both clas-
sically defined waves and particles. In 1927, Davisson and Germer demonstrated that
electrons show the same behavior, which was later extended to atoms and molecules
([Eil 13]).
In the quantum version of the double-slit Young’s experiment, a coherent light source,
such as a laser beam, illuminates a plate pierced by two parallel slits, and the light
passing through the slits is observed on a screen behind the plate. The wave nature of
light causes the light waves passing through the two slits to interfere, producing bright
and dark bands on the screen, which seems to mean that light is only waves.
Figure 2: The double-slit experiment
However, the light is always found to be absorbed at the screen at discrete points,
as individual particles, and the interference pattern only appears via the varying
density of these particle hits on the screen. Furthermore, versions of the experiment
that include detectors at the slits find that each detected photon passes through one
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slit (as would a classical particle), and not through both slits (as would a wave). So
the conclusion was that particles do not form the interference pattern if one detects
which slit they pass through ([Asp3 1990]).
For a long time, some scientists thought that the introduction of local hidden vari-
ables in Quantum Theory would allow them to precise which way photons or particles
chose in the double-split experiment. But the refutation of the EPR argument in the
1980’s forced them to give up that hope.
3.2 EPR and entanglement
In 1935, Einstein, Podosky and Rosen, anxious to highlight the incompleteness of
Quantum Mechanics and the need to introduce hidden variables, proposed an ex-
periment of thought that was actually done by the French physicist Alain Aspect in
1982. This experiment was based on the fact that, according to Quantum Mechan-
ics, some particle systems have the special property of being «entangled», so that
the knowledge of some observables characteristic of one of them lets you know the
status of others instantly. This property was considered a defect for the authors,
who wanted to show the incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics and its inability to
describe an objective reality.
More precisely, an entangled system is defined to be one whose quantum state cannot
be factored as a product of states of its local constituents; that is to say, they are not
individual particles but are an inseparable whole. In entanglement, one constituent
cannot be fully described without considering the other(s). Note that the state of
a composite system is always expressible as a sum, or superposition, of products of
states of local constituents; it is entangled if this sum necessarily has more than one
term.
Quantum systems can become entangled through various types of interactions. En-
tanglement is broken when the entangled particles decohere through interaction with
the environment; for example, when a measurement is made.
An entanglement is produced when a subatomic particle decays into an entangled
pair of other particles. The decay events obey the various conservation laws, and
as a result, the measurement outcomes of one daughter particle must be highly
correlated with the measurement outcomes of the other daughter particle (so that
the total momenta, angular momenta, energy, and so forth remain roughly the same
before and after this process).
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The special property of entanglement is maintained, even if we separate the said
two entangled particles by a very long distance. For example, if we measure a
particular characteristic of one of this pair (say, for example, spin), get a result,
and then measure the other particle using the same criterion (spin along the same
axis), we find that the result of the measurement of the second particle will match
(in a complementary sense) the result of the measurement of the first particle, in
that they will be opposite in their values.
A classical system would certainly display the same property. The difference is
that a classical system has definite values for all the observables all along, while
the quantum system does not. In a sense, the quantum system considered seems to
acquire a probability distribution for the outcome of a measurement of the spin along
any axis of the other particle upon measurement of the first particle. This probability
distribution is in general different from what it would be without measurement of the
first particle. This may certainly be perceived as surprising in the case of spatially
separated entangled particles.
The distance and timing of the measurements can be chosen so as to make the
interval between the two measurements spacelike, hence, any causal effect connecting
the events would have to travel faster than light. But, according to the principles of
special relativity, it is not possible for any information to travel between two such
measuring events. It is not even possible to say which of the measurements came
first. For two spacelike separated events e1 and e2, there are inertial frames in which
e1 is first and others in which e2 is first. Therefore, the correlation between the
two measurements cannot be explained as one measurement determining the other:
different observers would disagree about the role of cause and effect.
The conclusion of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen was that Quantum Mechanics in an
incomplete theory, and need hidden variables to explain the situation.
The EPR argument dates back to 1935 and its refutation, in the form of the rejection
of local hidden variable quantum theories, dates back to 1982 and the famous Aspect
experiments (see [Asp 76] for the project and [Asp 83] for the results), inspired by
John Bell and Bernard d’Espagnat.
Without going into details, let us say only that a very general statistical theorem,
the Bell’s theorem, to which all «realistic» theories satisfy, and in particular local
hidden-variable theories, is systematically violated by Quantum Mechanics, which
has been proven by experiments on both photons (polarized and unpolarized) and
2-spin particle systems.
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From the work of Greenberger, Horne, and Zelinger ([GHZ 90]), it has been learned
also that even more dramatic violations of local realism become possible for corre-
lated particle systems. GHZ’s initial argument focused on 3-particle systems, but
N -particle generalizations are possible. And even if the experimental verifications
have not yet been realized, it is very likely that the result will be the same as in
the case of the Aspect experiments, and will once again give reason to Quantum
Mechanics.
Still other experiments, such as that of Hardy’s thought experiment ([Har 92], [Har 93]),
equally show that the predictions of Quantum Mechanics should be always verified
and allow situations that local hidden variable theories prohibit. We take all these
situations for granted.
3.3 Wheeler’s experiments
Indeed, in 1978, Wheeler ([Whe 78] had already devised a thought experiment to
prove that the predictions of Quantum Mechanics were true and that the particles’
behavior was not only independent of space, but also independent of time. Lacking
adequate technology, this experiment could not be realized, but it was described as
«the possibility to use the receptor at the end of the apparatus to record well-defined
interference fringes»([Whe 78], which do not change anything to the result.
The distance of travel in a laboratory split-beam experiment might be about thirty
meters and the time a tenth of a microsecond. But the distance could as well have
been billions of light years and the time billions of years.
In 1983, Wheeler proposes an astronomical extension of his experiment. Suppose
two quasars separated by six seconds of arc and considered to be two distinct images
of one quasar. Assume also that evidence has been found for an intervening galaxy
G-I, roughly a quarter of the way from us to the quasar.
«Calculations indicate that a normal galaxy at such a distance has the power to
take two light rays, spead apart by fifty thousand light years on their way out from
the quasar, and bring them back together at the Earth. This circumstance, and
evidence for a new case of gravitational lensing, make it reasonable to promote the
spit-beam experiment in the delayed-choice version from the laboratory level to the
cosmological scale» ([Whe 83], 192).
What are the consequences?
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Figure 3: Wheeler’s cosmological experiment
At the end of the experiment, which takes time, light arrives on Earth and «we
discover "by which route" it came with the one arrangement or by the other, what
the relative phase is of the waves associated with the passage of the photon from
source to receptor "by both routes" – perhaps 50,000 light years apart as they pass
the lensing galax G-I. But the photon has already passed that galaxy billions of years
before we made our decision.»([Whe 83], 192).
In 1988, Wheeler comes to the following conclusion : «There is an inescapable sense in
which we, in the here and now, by a delayed setting of our analyzer of polarization to
one or another angle, have an inescapable, an irretrievable, an unavoidable influence
on what we have the right to say about what we call the past» ([Whe 88]).
Suppose now that the photon comes from even further, say, from the primordial
universe – in any case, as soon as the photons are released –, it means that close
decisions reach backward in time in their consequences, back even to the earliest
days of the universe.
Of course - Wheeler recognized - for the Copenhagen interpretation, it is a wrong
way of speaking. According to Bohr, «no elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon
until it is a registered (observed) phenomenon». It means that phenomena, called
into being by decisions, reach into the present from billion of years in the past.
Since 1982, a number of concrete so-called «delayed-choice» experiments have tended
to confirm this result, which is now admitted by leading physicists and mathemati-
cians, although they do require careful analysis. For some of them, perhaps it is
better to speak, as Wheeler also does, of «an elementary act of creation». As he
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writes, «it is wrong to think of that past as "already existing in details". The "past"
is theory. The past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present.»([Whe 88],
194).
But though puzzling the situation is, it is a fact : «By deciding what questions our
quantum registering equipement shall put in the present, we have an undeniable
choice in what we have the right to say about the past»([Whe 88], 194).
In 2006, the results of one of the first realizations of Wheeler’s experiment by Aspect
and the team of ENS Cachan in France, were again in agreement with the predictions
of Quantum Mechanics. We just report here the conclusion of the article :
«Our realization of Wheeler’s delayed-choice GedankenExperiment demonstrates be-
yond any doubt that the behavior of the photon in the interferometer depends on
the choice of the observable which is measured, even when that choice is made at a
position and a time such that it is separated from the entrance of the photon in the
interferometer by a space-like interval. In Wheeler’s words, since no signal traveling
at a velocity less than that of light can connect these two events, “we have a strange
inversion of the normal order of time. We, now, by moving the mirror in or out have
an unavoidable effect on what we have a right to say about the already past history
of that photon"» (see [Jac 06], 2-3).
As the authors said, with a bit of understatement, this surprising situation seems to
reveals «some tension» with Relativity.
This cautious conclusion has however drawn the wrath of a recent interpreter, who
considers that this is again a wrong way of speaking. Remaining as close as possible
to the Copenhagen interpretation, Hervé Zwirn ([Zwi 16]) tries to solve the problem
by considering that, since we can not speak of phenomena (and thus of trajectories or
positions, waves or particles) before they are duly recorded, each observation, linked
to a conscious observer, corresponds in sum to a way of seeing the world. As no
observation is contradictory with another, this solution is named by him «friendly
solipsism».
No need to be a great cleric to see that this interpretation is very much like Hugh
Everett’s theory of the many worlds, except that the worlds in question do not exist
outside of the consciousnesses of individuals. This looks like a kind of revival of the
old leibnizian monadology.
But Wheeler had bothered to eliminate such solutions. «Consciousness has nothing
whatsoever to do with the quantum process. We are dealing with an event that may
itself known by an irreverslble act of amplification, by an indelible record, an act of
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registration. Does that record subsequently enter into the "consciousness" of some
person, some animal or some computer? (...) Then that is a separate part of the
story, important but not to be confused with "quantum phenomenon".»([Whe 83],
196).
3.4 Scully’s experiment
Another delayed-choice experiment, involving entanglement has been made since the
publication of Wheeler’s articles. One among the most spectacular, probably, has
been carried out by the American physicist Marian Scully ([Scu 91]), specialized in
quantum optics. It belongs to a category of experiments named «delayed-choice
quantum eraser experiments», first performed by Yoon-Ho Kim, R. Yu, S. P. Ku-
lik, Y. H. Shih and Marlan O. Scully, and reported in early 1999 ([Kim 00], see
also [Scu 91]). This experiment was designed to investigate peculiar consequences of
the well-known double-slit experiment in Quantum Mechanics, as well as the conse-
quences of quantum entanglement.
In the double-slit experiment, as we know, if particle detectors are positioned at the
slits, showing through which slit the photon goes, the interference pattern disappears.
However, in 1982, Scully and Drühl proposed a «quantum eraser» to obtain which-
path information without scattering the particles or otherwise disturbating them.
Rather than attempting to observe which photon was entering each slit, they pro-
posed to «mark» them with information that, in principle, would allow the photons
to be distinguished after passing through the slits. Of course, the interference pattern
does disappear when the photons are so marked. However, the interference pattern
will reappear if the which-way information is further manipulated after the marked
photons have passed through the double slits to obscure the which-way markings.
Let us see in details how does it work.
The experiment begins as a conventional two-slit experiment. However, after the slits,
spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) is used to prepare an entangled
two-photon state. This is done by a crystal BBO (beta barium borate) that converts
the photon (from either slit) into two identical, orthogonally polarized entangled
photons with 1/2 the frequency of the original photon. The paths followed by these
orthogonally polarized photons are caused to diverge by a prism.
One of the photons, referred to as the «signal photon» continues to the target detector
called D0. A plot of «signal photon» counts detected by D0 can be examined to
discover whether the cumulative signal forms an interference pattern. The other
13
Figure 4: Scully’s experiment
entangled photon, referred to as the «idler photon», is deflected by prism PS that
sends it along divergent paths depending on whether it came from slit A or slit
B.
Somewhat beyond the path split, the idler photons encounter beam splittersBSa, BSb,
and BSc that each have a 50% chance of allowing the idler photon to pass through
and a 50% chance of causing it to be reflected. Ma and Mb are mirrors.
The beam splitters and mirrors direct the idler photons towards detectors labeled
D1, D2, D3 and D4. We can see that:
1. If an idler photon is recorded at detector D3, it can only have come from slit
B.
2. If an idler photon is recorded at detector D4, it can only have come from slit
A.
3. If an idler photon is detected at detector D1 or D2, it might have come from
slit A or slit B.
The optical path length measured from slit to D1, D2, D3, and D4 is 2.5m longer
than the optical path length from slit to D0. This means that any information that
one can learn from an idler photon must be approximately 8ns later than what one
can learn from its entangled signal photon.
Detection of the idler photon by D3 or D4 provides delayed «which-way information»
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indicating whether the signal photon with which it is entangled had gone through
slit A or B. On the other hand, detection of the idler photon by D1 or D2 provides
a delayed indication that such information is not available for its entangled signal
photon. Insofar as which-way information had earlier potentially been available from
the idler photon, it is said that the information has been subjected to a «delayed
erasure».
The results of the experiment are the following ones:
1. When the experimenters looked at the signal photons whose entangled idlers
were detected at D1 or D2, they detected interference patterns.
2. However, when they looked at the signal photons whose entangled idlers were
detected at D3 orD4, they detected simple diffraction patterns with no inter-
ference.
The significance of these results is similar to that of a classical double-slit experi-
ment, since interference is observed when it is not known from which slit the photon
originates, while no interference is observed when the path is known.
However, what makes this experiment possibly astonishing is that, unlike in the
classic double-slit experiment, the choice of whether to preserve or erase the which-
path information of the idler was not made until 8ns after the position of the signal
photon had already been measured by D0.
So, everything goes as if the idler photon have «said» to its entangled signal photon,
just before it reaches the detector D0 :
– In the first case, that the observer knows which way it followed and so, that if has
to behave as a particle and let just a hit on the screen;
– In the second case, that the «which way» information is lost and that it has now
to behave as a wave and interfere with itself.
Scully merely reports the results of the experiment without interpreting them, but it
is clear that it fully checks the predictions of QuantumMechanics as well as Wheeler’s
assertions.
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4 Performing the cosmological experiment
In the previous experiment, and all those of the same type performed in a labo-
ratory, the distances, as Wheeler already observed, were obviously very short and
the delay between the two observations no longer than a few nanoseconds. But, as
we have seen, Wheeler proposed a cosmological experiment which remained also a
GedankenExperiment until 2017.
At that date, a new experiment, more in line with what Wheeler had imagined, came
into play.
The physicist Paolo Villoresi and his colleagues at the University of Padua (see
[Vil 14] and [Vil 17]) sought to know what Wheeler’s experience would be if it was
done with a laser beam over a long distance. As the researchers explained in an
article published in Science Advances, they used the instruments available at the
Italian Matera Laser Ranging Observatory (MLRO) to create a giant Mach-Zender
interferometer by connecting the observatory and satellites in low Earth orbit a
laser beam. Despite a photon distance of about 3,500 km, Wheeler’s delayed choice
experiment gave the same results as its much smaller terrestrial counterparts. Of
course, this reinforces our confidence in the universal validity of Quantum Physics
equations, but asks also a puzzling question : Have we, yes or no, acted on the
past?
Figure 5: Villoresi’s cosmological experiment
We do not want to comment this experiment in detail. We merely describe the
previous figure. A photon wave packet enters the first BS of an interferometer,
which extends along thousands of kilometers in space. The interferometer can be
randomly arranged according to two configurations that correspond to the presence
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or absence of the second BS (in/out BS) located on Earth. Following Wheeler’s
idea, the configuration choice is performed when the photon has already entered
the interferometer. In the actual implementation, the interferometer begins and
terminates on the ground, extending up to the target satellite, and the measurement
choice performed on ground is space-like separated from the photon reflection by the
satellite. The results are of the same kind as in the Scully’s experiment.
5 Retrocausality?
In the standard view conveyed by the Copenhagen interpretation, if a photon in
flight is interpreted as being in the so-called «superposition of states», i.e. if it is
interpreted as something that has the potentiality to manifest as a particle or wave,
but during its time in flight is neither, then there is, in principle, no time paradox. Far
more, the common element in the previous experiments is that it is the link between
some separation apparatus and an appropriately spatially-positioned detector (see
[Fey 65]) that induces the collapse of the state vector to an eigenstate, so that the
detector will only register one of the eigenstates. The motto is in short: «go around,
there is nothing to see».
In fact, I am afraid things be more complicated and I would want to propose some
new «GedankenExperimenten», even if they are not really plausible and, as a result,
will never be likely performed.
I will start with some observations about the past and the so-called «historical»
facts.
From the Trojan War to the Gulf War, military history has been marked as much
by luck and error as by heroism and genius. Sometimes very small events have even
been decisive in the outcome of a battle. That is what Erik Durschmied ([Dur 00],
in a book I reported elsewhere ([Par 08]), called «the logic of the grain of sand» : a
fact or behavior, totally unpredictable, would sometimes upset the objective data of
a conflict and allow the triumph of one of the two camps over the other.
Here I would like to go down a few orders of magnitude and consider what could
happen to some past events if, as in the case of the Schrödinger’s cat, it turned out
that we could - if only in thought - make them depend on microphysical realities :
no longer human actions or even «grains of sand» in this case, but a few photons
or wave packets whose behavior, after all, may have been as well important at some
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time : somebody may be dazzled by a beam of light and, because of that, could have
reacted inappropriately and made a bad decision.
Of course, no chance to recover photons from Waterloo or Pearl Harbour and to
modify the outcomes of these battles. But the experiment remains plausible if applied
to a near past and to very simple stimuli. It is known that, in the best visibility
conditions, about 400 photons hit the human retina. However, as the threshold
duration of the excitation is only a fraction of a second, a few photons are enough
to trigger the phenomenon of visual sensation, as shown by experiments conducted
by Hecht, Shaer and Pirenne in 1941, then by Van der Velden in 1944. The latter
set the threshold, that is to say the intensity which causes 50 % positive responses
to 2 photons corresponding to the wavelength of 507 mµ, provided that they arrive
on the optical ganglion with between them an interval of time lower than a certain
τ , equal to the rate of relaxation of the ganglion neuron (see [Gou 52], 112-114). It
would therefore be sufficient that, by a suitable device, these 2 photons could be
entangled and recovered in appropriate detectors to make us able to act on the past
of a human perception and, as it may happen, to modify, as was said above, the
evolution of a past event.
Obviously, such a pseudo-experiment is pure speculation, and it is doubtful that it
can ever be realized. What I want to say is that we can not be content with what
the Copenhagen interpretation tells us, because the vagueness in which it leaves the
behavior of the particles between the moment they are emitted by the source and the
one where they are detected - the famous superposition of states - no longer holds
when precisely linking this behavior to macroscopic realities.
Now it is a fact that microphysical entities, whatever they may be, not only have
quantum effects but, step by step, effects at higher levels. For the purpose of the
demonstration, I chose historical facts, but I might as well have chosen - and prob-
ably with greater chances of being plausible - biological realities. Who knows if the
behavior of elementary particles does not have effects on certain genetic mutations?
Everything suggests that this is probably the case, and one can then imagine other
thought experiments where present manipulations could command significant bifur-
cations in the near past evolution of the living. I am not saying that to admit the
existence of a retrocausality is to think that we could remotely modify the length of
the nose of Cleopatra, for God knows what consequences on the behavior of Caesar
or Pompey, the continuation of the Roman history and, more generally, the rest of
world history in general. But, here again, if we could isolate some genetic effects
of entangled particles, experiments on generations of viruses or bacteria could be
considered.
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All that only proves something is wrong in our present Quantum Physics. Despite the
stoic philosopher Cleanthes (∼-330 -232) who seems to have been one of the few to
deny the irrevocability of the past, we can not admit such an instability and no more
accept an infinite multiplication of parallel (orthogonal, in fact) universes à la Hugh
Everett. There is a very little chance this might be true. But, on the contrary, I do
not think that we should take literally Niels Bohr’s famous phrase simply identifying
phenomena with registered (or observed) phenomena. It is simply not tenable and
the existence of proven historical realities whose existence remains partly hidden and
of which we only become acquainted long after they have occurred, in the form of
direct or indirect traces, when it is not fossils, is sufficient to show the adventurous
nature of such a statement.
Scientists who follow a little too closely Niels Bohr’s idealistic assertions about the
existence of phenomena would do well to think twice. Again to support our argument
and to make clear what we mean, let us put the problem in the field of medicine.
Everyone will agree, I think, that humanity is subject to very real pathologies since it
exists, but, of course, these are only discovered, named and understood in the course
of history. For example, whooping cough, cholera, scarlet fever or AIDS existed long
before they were discovered, and in fact long before we understood they were just
examples of, respectively, Gram-negative cocci, Gram-negative bacilli, Gram-positive
cocci and viral diseases. On the other hand, the deviations of the modern pharma-
ceutical industry lead sometimes to the creation of «ad hoc» diseases, the reality
of which is not proven. However, particularly important populations are generally
targeted to maximize potential revenue : these are examples of «disease mongerings»
(see, for example, alopecia, restless leg syndrome, testosterone deficiency, hypoactive
sexual desire disorder, etc.). But who would dare to argue that these pseudo-diseases
have the same reality as the previous ones? The former are real diseases, validated
by biochemistry; the later are only socio-linguistic constructions. Therefore, it is not
enough to name a phenomenon so that it corresponds to a real existence. In the field
we talk about, the difference between the two kinds of diseases is precisely that of
good and bad medicine.
Indeed, there is no good and bad physics. Quantum Mechanics has just to be as
good physics as the theory of relativity. Consequently, the least we can recognize
is that it must not create social or mental chimeras. It has to describe objective
phenomena that must be objectively reported.
So, where is the solution? Must we think that we live in a «participatory universe»
(see [Zei 04], [Zei 08]) or all this is only misinterpretations?
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6 Discussion
Delayed-choice experiments seem to suggest not only that the future may influenced
the past but that, symmetrically, the past will allow us to know about the future
before it happens.
As the 2 particles P1 and P2, actually correlated, are separated in space-time by a
spacelike interval, we could therefore deduce that, since they could not influence each
other by means of a signal in the time interval considered, communication - if there
is communication - should have followed another path in the Einsteinian space-time,
which is a fully deployed block.
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Figure 6: Einsteinian space-time and quantum correlations
Let us recall, however, that the velocity of a signal, according to the theory of
relativity, is bounded superiorly by the speed of light, and that the particles have
been precisely chosen in such a way that no signal of this kind can exist, in any case,
in the time interval considered by the experiment. And as the particles could not
have influenced each other through the present, it therefore remains to be assumed
that they have had some communication «by taking a relay either in the past or in the
future» ([Cos 80], 68). We shall see that some physicists like Costa de Beauregard
have supported this thesis in these words (see, in particular, [Cos 79], 429-431),
bringing this characteristic zig-zag closer to the Feynman diagrams assimilating a
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positron to an electron going back in time. On the contrary, other physicists and,
in general, epistemologists, consider this interpretation as completely abusive and
appropriate to reinforce the most irrationalist theses (see [Gra 98], 238-239).
In fact, the experiments reported above, reveal a total reversibility. The interference
pattern can only be seen retroactively once the idler photons have been detected
and the experimenter has had information about them available, when some signal
photons were matched with idlers gone to particular detectors.
So, for the mainstream interpretation, there is no retrocausality at all but only
correlations of entangled photons’ observables that can be described in two ways : in
the historic order and we say that the position at D0 of the detected signal photon
determines the probabilities for the idler photon to hit either of D1, D2, D3 or D4;
on in the reverse order, and we say that the detector Di, at which the idler photon is
detected, determines the probability distribution at D0 for the signal photon.
But, symmetrically, no advanced causality, and so, no knowledge of the future is
possible : as the total pattern of signal photons at the primary detector never shows
interference, so it is not possible to deduce what will happen to the idler photons by
observing the signal photons alone. Indeed, the delayed-choice quantum eraser can
not communicate information in a retro-causal manner because it would necessitate
a process that go faster than the speed of light, which is totally excluded.
Another argument in favor of this interpretation is a theorem proved by Philippe
Eberhard, which shows that if the accepted equations of relativistic quantum field
theory are correct, it should never be possible to experimentally violate causality
using quantum effects (see [Ebe 89], [Ell 15]). So, for most authors, delayed-choice
experiments reveal, once more, the well-know effects of non-locality and that is all.
We agree that those experiments do not prove we can know anything about the
future.
Indeed, for relativity theory, as we have recalled, the future is already over there, in
some part of space-time. It is probably the reason why, despite Eberhard’s proof,
some physicists have speculated that these experiments might be changed in a way
that would be consistent with previous observations, yet which could allow for ex-
perimental causality violations (see [Cram 95], [Cram 14], [Wer 00]).
I am not suggesting that these interpretations are necessarily the right ones. But
I affirm that we can no longer be satisfied today with explanations that are just
dogmas imposed by a purely pragmatist, instrumentalist and, ultimately, positivist
philosophy which, when in difficulty with experimentation, tries to escape in the
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pleasant manner of Wheeler, by making the particle «a great smoky dragon that is
only sharp where it enters the interferometer and where it leaves the interferometer
biting the detector». Metaphors have nothing to do in physics and the collapse of
the wave function would have also to be explained.
Of course, for anyone who knows a little physics, «great smoky dragon» means «non-
locality», and «non-locality» refers to the formalism of Quantum Mechanics and a
strict reading of Hermitian reversibility. But the word only points in the direction of a
problem: what is the meaning of this non-locality? A new field hitherto unnoticed?
But where are its characteristics and how to experiment with it? We should get
variables or parameters that can be measured. But mainstream Quantum Mechanics,
supposedly complete, forbids them and, in fact, we must recognize that they can
not exist in the form of hidden local variables. Anyway, the non-locality is only
a word, and the «veiled reality» to which some physicists like Bernard d’Espagnat
appeal to explain it, recalls, without going much further, those «general principles
of the corporal nature and mechanics» that Leibniz in his Discourse of metaphysics
(§18) called «metaphysical», and which, according to him, were «forms or indivisible
natures» that cause the appearance (see [Esp 08], 271 and [Par 91], 65).
Bernard d’Espagnat himself, although he always rejected the idea that his «veiled
reality» could replace religious beliefs, was not far from seeing God behind this one.
The deep french philosopher Raymond Ruyer had however, in his time, rejected
such a thought: "It is naive", he wrote, "to imagine that beyond space-time and
observables, begins immediately the reign of God, of the One, of the Eternal, and the
competence of the theologian. The trans-spatial is not the supernatural" ([Ruy 70],
86). Behind the world of appearances exists that of quantum physics and this vast
domain of trans-space. But "one does not find in it the ubiquity, the eternity and
the divine unity, but a sort of relative ubiquity, of relative eternity, of relative unity"
which is in fact that of consciences and memories without which these phenomena
would lose all meaning. Without doubt, just as rationalism, for Bachelard, became,
with the scientific revolutions of the twentieth century, a surrationalism, so could
the expanded naturalism of contemporary science be called, if it did not lead to
confusion, "trans-naturalism". In this sense, the unobservable trans-spatial could
gradually merge into an unknowable trans-natural. But, as far as we can speak of
it, the unknowable divine would be at best a limit.
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7 Free-Will theorem and other connected proposi-
tions
Assume now, for a while, that a kind of connection between the future and the past
may exist : we do not speak of «retrocausality» and do no more suppose that the past
might be a posteriori modified, except perhaps at a level with very limited macro-
scopic consequences, i.e. in the limit of indetermination allowed by the Heisenberg
principle. What consequence on the alleged human freedom? Does it mean we are
free or not?
For different reasons, the various attempts to apply modern physics to living beings
([Fan 44], [Jor 48]) had not been very convincing. As Raymond Ruyer once remarked,
«contemporary physicists who, taking micro-physical indeterminism seriously, have
spoken of the "freedom of the electron" by relating it to human freedom, have not
had very good press»([Ruy 52], 153). Remaining, on the contrary, as close as possible
to the teachings of quantum physics, this philosopher, aware of the advances of this
science, had introduced, for every entity existing in the manner of a «subject», the
notions of «absolute flying-over domain», of «trans-spatial region» and of «finality»,
which he regarded as intrinsic characteristics of all physical beings.
If the first two characteristics seemed to correspond to the phenomena of superpo-
sition of states and entanglement, the idea of finality seemed to overstep the possi-
bilities of a particle. But Ruyer supported the idea that freedom does not consist in
producing movements without reason. And if it seemed difficult, in appearance, to
find in microphysics, the equivalent of the «end» characteristic of the free activity,
which always seeks to reach a final state, optimal, according to a norm, we could
notice that reduced to the essentials, this character only returned to this: an activity
whose changes could not be related to causes a tergo, but were defined by a final
state in the most general sense of the word. Thus, Ruyer observed, «an atom of
hydrogen is self-made incessantly. It can no more "be there" once and for all, than a
living being or a social institution. Since it is nevertheless possible to characterize it
as a hydrogen atom, it must therefore obey a norm, and its nature must be a physis
in the etymological sense of the word»([Ruy 52], 157) .
Curiously, some recent physicists have re-investigated the problem.
The «free will theorem» of John H. Conway and Simon B. Kochen states that if we
have a free will in the sense that our choices are not a function of the past, then not
subjected to certain assumptions, so must some elementary particles. Conway and
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Kochen’s article was published in Foundations of Physics in 2006 (see [Con 06]). In
2009 they published a stronger version of the theorem in the Notices of the AMS (see
[Con 09]). And later, Kochen elaborated some details ([Koc 17]).
The proof of the theorem as originally formulated relies on three axioms, which
Conway and Kochen call «fin», «spin», and «twin», the last two being able to be
verified experimentally.
Fin: There is a maximal speed for propagation of information (not necessarily the
speed of light). Such an assumption rests upon causality.
Spin: The squared spin component of certain elementary particles of spin one, taken
in three orthogonal directions, is a permutation of (1,1,0).
Twin: It is possible to «entangle» two elementary particles and separate them by
a significant distance, so that they have the same squared spin results if measured
in parallel directions. This is a consequence of quantum entanglement (full en-
tanglement is not necessary for the twin axiom to hold : it is sufficient but not
necessary).
In their later paper, «The Strong Free Will Theorem», Conway and Kochen replace
the Fin-axiom by a weaker one calledMin, thereby strengthening the theorem. Min
asserts only that two experimenters separated in a space-like way can make choices
of measurements independently of each other. In particular it is not postulated that
the speed of transfer of all information is subject to a maximum limit, but only of the
particular information about choices of measurements. More recently, Kochen argued
that Min could be replaced by Lin - experimentally testable Lorentz Covariance.
The free will theorem states:
Given the axioms, if the two experimenters in question are free to make choices
about what measurements to take, then the results of the measurements cannot be
determined by anything previous to the experiments : the outcome is open.
If the outcome of an experiment was open, then one or two of the experimenters
might have acted under free will.
Since the theorem applies to any arbitrary physical theory consistent with the axioms,
it would not even be possible to place the information into the universe’s past in an
ad hoc way. The argument proceeds from the Kochen–Specker theorem, which shows
that the result of any individual measurement of spin was not fixed independently of
the choice of measurements. As stated by Cator and Landsman regarding hidden-
variable theories, «there has been a similar tension between the idea that the hidden
24
variables (in the pertinent causal past) should on the one hand include all ontological
information relevant to the experiment, but on the other hand should leave the
experimenters free to choose any settings they like»(see [Cat 14]).
The conclusion to be drawn from the theorem seems to be that «science does not
support determinism». Quantum Mechanics obviously shows that particles do indeed
behave in a way that is not a function of the past. But some critics have argued that
the theorem applies only to deterministic models when others have claimed that the
indeterminism Conway and Kochen think to have established was already assumed
in the premises of their proof.
Thus, no decisive argument exists in favor of an elementary «freedom» of particles,
nor of any relation between it and our supposed human «freedom», moreover envis-
aged only here in the form of a cartesian «free will». Maybe we are free to make (or
not) physical experiments, but this does not mean that nature is free to do anything.
Ruyer’s definition of freedom as a finalist activity was surely a better one, but the
difference in level between particle physics and the sciences capable of explaining the
behavior of the living (and especially of the human living) is such that it renders all
comparisons very delicate..
8 Acommodating retrocausality with Free will?
Indeed, there is effectively a tension between freedom and causality, especially when
it appears, no matter what, in the form of retrocausality. This could be, of course, a
false problem, especially if we reject the possibility of retrocausal actions. Neverthe-
less, a number of physicists ask the question. We shall try, here, to give an account
of their arguments.
Retrocausality is not, in fact, a new idea. Before Wheeler’experiments and Aharonov
two-vector approach to Quantum Mechanics (voir [Aha 97]), i.e. as early as 1947,
and explicitly in 1953, Olivier Costa de Beauregard ([Cos 53]) - as said above -
had already evoked such a hypothesis to which he had then held his whole life.
However, his presentation has been subsequently modified in the course of time. In
one of his latter books ([Cos 88]), the EPR situation was read in terms of conditional
probabilities, so that predictive calculations when one follows the direct order of
events, and retroductive calculations, when one follows the inverse order, are formally
identical. Consequently, the notion of causality is simply reduced to the notion of
law, Hermitian reversibility plays a full role, and we are no longer very far from the
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Copenhagen interpretation. The explanation of this reversibility is just connected to
the CPT-invariance.
The ideas of Costa de Beauregard were founded on Loschmidt observation that Boltz-
mann could not deduce his H-theorem asserting that entropy is always increasing in
a closed system from the laws of dynamics which are completely symmetric relatively
to the variable t (for some solutions, see [Aha 15], [Sta17 ]). A more puzzling prob-
lem comes with some models of non-standard cosmology like the Gold universe (see
[Gol 62], [Gol 62], [Gol 67]; and also [Pri 66], [Mer 12]). In this kind of model, the
universe expands for some time, with increasing entropy and a thermodynamic arrow
of time pointing in the direction of the expansion but, after it reaches a low-density
state, it recontracts. Then entropy decreases, pointing the thermodynamic arrow of
time in the opposite direction, until the universe ends in a low-entropy, high-density
Big Crunch. This suggests the universe will become more orderly after the moment
of contraction. Of course, the Gold model is necessary linked to the possibility of
retrocausal change, and so, questions arise concerning the preservation of information
in states of decreasing entropy, where a reverse causation should exist.
But it is one thing to say that time does not exist in microphysics where, apart from
the case of mesons, there is nowhere irreversibility, and it is another thing to consider
squarely a total reversal of the arrow of time and causal relationships. One could
estimate in the 1960s that cosmological retrocausality seems to be independent of
quantic retrocausality. But it is no longer the case in 2019 where cosmology became
quantic cosmology.
Retrocausality may be accommodated with free will insofar we stay in the frame of
Quantum Physics stricto sensu. But what happens, for example, in a Gold universe?
Must we think that, after the low density point, the course of history is totally
reversed as in «The Curious Case of Benjamin Button», this fantastic novel of Francis
Scott Fitzgerald ([Fit 22]), whose David Fincher made a movie? One will say that,
as everybody and everything will be like the heroe, nothing is change. But what
happens to men (and things) born or made in the world just before the cusp and
submitted, first to an increasing entropy, and then, to a decreasing one? Can we save
a free will in such a universe? Indeed, it would be very strange to have intentions
and to make projects in a universe where, instead of being performed, they suddenly
collapse, especially since all the things on which we could count or on which our
intentions or projects were based, gradually disappear from our sight... A solution
would be to substitute to the Gold universe a multiverse where decreasing entropy
concern a world which is not ours. That already was the solution of Boltzmann to
accommodate entropy with reversibility of dynamical laws.
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Proponents of David Bohm’s theory (see, for instance, [Wha 18]) do not take into
account such situations, preferring models which, including apparent particle-like
behavior and allowing controllable constraints on unknown past fields, are retrocausal
but not retro-signaling and respect the conventional block universe viewpoint of
classical spacetime.
9 Conclusions
Quantum physics obviously reveals a quite surprising world with very strange situa-
tions, as those like superposition of states, EPR argument and delayed-choice experi-
ments, all situations which confine to philosophy, especially to the philosophy of time,
but not only : the collapse of the wave function and the paradox of measurement,
the existence of non-locality, the possibility a subtle form of retrocausality seem to
point to an entity or a structure which knows neither time nor space. Strangeness
is still increasing with quantum cosmology, which is concerned with the beginning
(resp. the end) of the universe, brings to its peak the tension between time and the
absence of time and ask questions about human freedom.
Some take the plunge and do not hesitate to venture on the paths of metaphysics,
even of theology (see [Crai 79a]) - sometimes founded on scientific confirmations :
for example, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem ([Bor 03]), a cosmological theorem
which deduces that any universe that has, on average, been expanding throughout its
history cannot be infinite in the past but must have a past space-time boundary, e.g.
the quantum vacuum, which contains quantifiable, measurable energy, and cannot
be described as ’nothing’, therefore, as ’uncaused’ (see [Crai 79b]).
But, whatever the subtlety of all the arguments used, it remains that to apply human
reasoning to the totality of what exists - the universe understood as the set of all
things or of all events - even avoiding the paradox of «the set of all sets», is certainly,
as Kant had seen, perfectly illegitimate. In any case, it seems difficult to infer
from the fact that science, temporarily, marks the step and seems to be bumping
against realities momentarily exceeding our understanding, that these realities could
be the basis of a consistent extrapolation. It is precisely this kind of transcendental
extrapolation that Kant forbade himself, by bringing back the figure of God (who
may be for him, however, object of belief), to a simple dressing of the disjunctive
syllogism. The only difference with Quantum Physics, is that the alternative, as von
Weizäcker already noted (see [Hei 73]), does not include only ’yes’ or ’no’ answers,
but all the complementary solutions. In this sense, Bohr’s theory, even unsatisfactory,
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will at least have the merit of being a guardrail in front of mystical irrationalism. But
the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Physics is not, for all that, satisfactory
and we must have to wait, before going further, new discoveries. We must have to
be creative, for sure, but we must also have to be patient, and not go too fast.
Without doubt, just as rationalism, for Bachelard, became, with the scientific revolu-
tions of the XXth century, a «super-rationalism», so could the expanded naturalism of
contemporary science be called, if it did not lead to confusion, a «trans-naturalism».
In this sense, the unobservable trans-spatial of Quantum Mechanics could gradually
merge into an unknowable trans-natural. Science must stop there. The rest is meta-
physics, but if philosophy can legitimately take a look at science ([Bar 10]), science
must remain science.
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